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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of reported child sexual abuse
cases has risen dramatically.' Although more and more cases
are reported, the conviction rate of sexual offenders remains
low.2 There are many reasons for this disparity. The child is
usually the only witness to the crime, and may be very afraid
or reluctant to testify against the attacker. Moreover, to avoid
subjecting their child to the further trauma of the courtroom
experience, parents often do not cooperate with the
prosecution. 4
Recognizing the difficulty of prosecuting child sexual
abuse cases, many states have adopted legislation designed to
reduce trauma to children and to improve the conviction rate
of sexual offenders.5 One example of a recent legislative
reform allows the child witness/victim to present his or her
testimony from outside the courtroom via closed circuit televi-
sion.6 The child is thus protected from further trauma by
1. Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985) [hereinafter Testimony of Child
Victims].
2. Id. at 806.
3. Note, The Constitutionality of the Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Television to
Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 995 (1985).
4. Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 1, at 807.
5. This Note will focus only on one such recent procedure: the transmission of
testimony by simultaneous electronic means, such as closed circuit television. Other
examples of recent legislative reforms are the enactment of special hearsay exceptions
for children's out-of-court statements of abuse and the videotaping of the child's
testimony by deposition or at a preliminary hearing for later use at trial. See
generally, Testimony of Child Victims, supra note 1; Bulkley, Introduction:
Background and Overview of Child Sexual Abuse, Law Reforms in the Mid-1980's, 40
U. MIAMI L. REV. 5 (1985).
6. At the time of this writing, 25 states have enacted legislation that provides for
the testimony of a child/witness via closed circuit television: Alabama: ALA. CODE
§ 15-25-3 (Supp. 1987); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (Supp. 1987);
California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1987); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (Supp. 1988); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 92.54 (Supp. 1988); Georgia:
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55 (Supp. 1987); Hawaii:' HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626:616(d) (1985);
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being removed from the unfamiliar atmosphere of the court-
room and from the physical presence of her attacker. How-
ever, allowing the child to testify via closed circuit television
may constitute an abridgement of the accused's right to con-
front his accuser at trial.7
Statutes that permit the use of televised testimony have
been consistently upheld by the courts in the face of constitu-
tional' challenges because the underlying purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause have been satisfied.9 Therefore, the primary
concern has been determining when invocation of the televised
testimony statute is appropriate and constitutionally permissi-
ble rather than whether the statute as a whole will pass consti-
tutional muster. In other words, what admissibility standard
should a court adopt before permitting the child to testify
outside of court? What must be shown for a court to conclude
that there is a compelling need to protect the child from fur-
ther injury or that the child is intimidated by the presence of
the accused?
This Comment begins by providing a brief outline of the
procedures regulating the use of televised testimony. Next,
against the larger backdrop of the history of the right to con-
frontation, Part III addresses the treatment of televised testi-
mony as hearsay. This section presents a recent Maryland
decision as an illustration of the undesirable analogy of tele-
vised testimony to hearsay that leads to a more difficult admis-
sion standard. Part III concludes with the argument that
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1988); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1558 (1986); Kentucky:
KY. REV. STAT. § 421.350 (Supp. 1988); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:283 (West
Supp. 1988); Maryland: MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987);
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D (West Supp. 1988); Minnesota:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (1988); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (Supp.
1987); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1988); New York: N.Y.
CRiM. PROC. LAW § § 65.00-65.30 (Supp. 1988); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41
(Anderson 1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 753 (West Supp. 1988);
Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1987); Texas: TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071
(Vernon Supp. 1988); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Supp. 1988); and Vermont:
VT. R. EVID. 807(e) (1985).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Refer to text accompanying note 19, irfra, for the
pertinent language.
8. See In re Appeal in Pinal County Juvenile Action, 147 Ariz. 302, 709 P.2d 1361
(1985); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1986); State v. Warford, 223 Neb.
368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977
(1986).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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televised testimony is the functional equivalent of in-court tes-
timony, and thus, a hearsay analysis is inappropriate.
Part IV of this Comment presents a recent Supreme Court
decision directly addressing the value of face-to-face confronta-
tion. This landmark decision now provides courts with the
proper admissibility standard for a procedure in which actual
face-to-face confrontation is lacking. Finally, Part V presents
an appeal to the Washington legislature urging the adoption of
a statute authorizing the use of televised testimony and incor-
porating the guidelines suggested in this Comment.
II. THE TAKING OF TELEVISED TESTIMONY:
A STATUTORY COMPOSITE
The various state enactments authorizing the use of tele-
vised testimony are procedurally similar. The child is typically
removed to a suitable setting outside the courtroom. The only
other parties present with the child are the judge, the prose-
cuting attorney, defense counsel, the camera operator, and a
person whose presence would contribute to the welfare and
well-being of the child.10 The statute may also provide that the
support person is in no way to coach, cue, or influence the
child's testimony."
The jury and defendant remain in the courtroom. When
testimony is transmitted to the courtroom by simultaneous
electronic means, the statutes may require the trial court to
ensure that the courtroom be equipped with monitors that per-
mit the jury, the defendant, and everyone else present to see
and hear the transmission;' 2 that the transmission be in color;13
that the witness be visible on the monitor at all times;14 that
every voice transmitted be audible and identified;" and that
the transmission not be altered in any way.' 6
Most importantly, the procedure must allow the defendant
to be in constant communication with his attorney during the
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86g(a) (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(3)
(Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(b) (1988).
11. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
12. See, e.g., id. § 1347(b)(3); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(7)(d) (West
Supp. 1988).
13. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16D(b)(7)(b).
14. See, e.g., id.
15. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B)(3) (Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-1558(a)(2)(C) (1986).
16. See, e.g., Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B)(3); KAI. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1558(a)(2)(B); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.41(D) (Anderson 1987).
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child's testimony. This is usually accomplished through a pri-
vate telephone line. 7 Thus, the defendant's opportunity to
cross-examine the child is not impaired.
Some statutes also provide for two-way closed circuit tele-
vised testimony. 8 Not only is the child's image broadcast into
the courtroom, but the image of the defendant is also transmit-
ted to a monitor in full view of the child.
These procedural guidelines ensure that the taking of the
televised testimony substantially comports with the reliability
and trustworthiness of receiving testimony in open court.
However, regardless of how accurate the transmission is, the
procedure still raises confrontation issues.
III. THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The primary issue raised in connection with statutes that
allow the child victim of sexual abuse to testify via closed cir-
cuit television is whether the defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation under the sixth amendment is violated. The
sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[iln all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him."19
The Confrontation Clause is based upon the rationale that
face-to-face confrontation between the accuser and accused
enhances the truth-seeking function of a trial.20 The purpose
of this physical confrontation is to allow the fact-finder the
opportunity to view the demeanor of the witness in front of
the accused, the one person who knows whether the witness is
being truthful.21 The Confrontation Clause also requires the
witness to be present at the trial and allows for the witness to
be cross-examined by the defendant.22
Although many Supreme Court cases have emphasized
that the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to
17. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405(4) (Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:84A-
32.4(d) (West Supp. 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985(a) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
18. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626:616(d); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.41; VT. R. EvID. 807(e).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988); Testimony of Child Victims,
supra note 1, at 810.
21. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1969); Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
22. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158; Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
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secure the benefit of cross-examination, 23 the right to encoun-
ter one's accusers face-to-face remains an essential guarantee.24
A. Televised Testimony as the Equivalent of Hearsay
The typical arena in which a court discusses the underly-
ing purposes of the Confrontation Clause is when it must
determine the admissibility of hearsay evidence.25 The func-
tions of the Confrontation Clause and the rules against admit-
ting hearsay evidence protect similar values. A statement
made out of court is inherently less reliable than a sworn state-
ment made at trial because the declarant has not been sub-
jected to the safeguards that ensure the accuracy of her
testimony: the declarant's statement was not made under oath;
the declarant was not subject to cross-examination at the time
the statement was made; and the declarant was not in the pres-
ence of the trier of fact, thus her demeanor went unobserved.26
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."27 If the
definition of hearsay is literally construed, then televised testi-
mony is hearsay because the testimony takes place from
outside the courtroom.
In Ohio v. Roberts,2" the Supreme Court set out a two-pro-
nged test for determining the admissibility of hearsay state-
ments: "[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his state-
23. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 418 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965).
24. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988). See infra notes 73-91 and accompanying
text.
25. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
26. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 (3rd ed. 1984).
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
28. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of
Bernard Isaacs and with possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Mr. and Mrs.
Isaacs. At a preliminary hearing, the Isaacs' daughter, Anita, testified that she had
permitted the defendant to use her apartment for several days, but refused to admit
that she had given Roberts the checks and credit cards without informing him that she
did not have permission to use them. Before the case went to trial, the state tried
unsuccessfully to locate Anita. At trial, Roberts testified that he received the checks
and credit cards from Anita with permission to use them. The state, on rebuttal,
sought to admit the transcript of Anita's testimony from the preliminary hearing. Id.
at 58-59.
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ment is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliabil-
ity.' "29 Therefore, before the televised testimony may be
admitted as evidence, the Roberts test must first be met.
Consequently, several state statutes authorizing the use of
televised testimony have adopted an admissibility standard
requiring a finding of "unavailability. 30 Yet, the Confronta-
tion Clause should not be interpreted to require a strict show-
ing of unavailability as a predicate of the use of televised
testimony. Furthermore, as illustrated by the following case,
the unavailability test is unnecessarily harsh and fails to strike
an acceptable balance between protecting the interests of the
state and those of the defendant.
B. Wildermuth v. State
In Wildermuth v. State,3 the Maryland Court of Appeals
heard an appeal from the defendant challenging the constitu-
tionality of section 9-102 of the Code of Maryland, Courts and
Judicial Proceedings, 2 allowing a child sexual abuse victim to
testify via closed circuit television. The court determined that
29. Id. at 66.
30. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
§ 92.54(1) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(c) (1988).
31. 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275 (1987).
32. Section 9-102 in full provides:
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-901 of the Family Law
Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony
of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom
by means of closed circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in
the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant,
and the judge may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every
effort to be unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child
when the child testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in
the opinion of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a
person who has dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the
abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge
and the defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate
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the statute, on its face, did not violate the accused's constitu-
tional right to confrontation.33 However, failure to satisfy the
statutory requirements would, according to the Wildermuth
court, violate the defendant's constitutional right. Because the
prosecution failed to show that physical confrontation between
the child and the defendant would have resulted in the child
suffering serious emotional distress to the degree that she
could not testify,34 the statutory provisions3 5 were not satis-
fied.36  Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the
defendant's conviction.
At trial, Wildermuth's nine year old daughter was allowed
to testify via closed circuit television after the judge heard oral
arguments from both counsel on the issue of whether to per-
mit her to so testify.37 Two expert witnesses, a counselor psy-
chologist and a director of a victim assistance center, testified
that the child would probably suffer some degree of emotional
distress if required to testify in the courtroom and in the pres-
ence of her father.38 The trial judge then granted the motion
to allow testimony under section 9-102, finding that the child
was "reticent and unable to verbalize in certain situations" and"would not be able to communicate" if required to testify
under customary procedures.39
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the trial judge
erred in allowing the child to testify outside the courtroom
because the minimum threshhold requirement necessary to
invoke section 9-102 was not met.4" The court emphasized that
the Confrontation Clause requires the accuser to view the
accused when the former is testifying.4' Because actual physi-
with the persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate
electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an
attorney pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of
identification of a defendant, the presence of bath the victim and the
defendant in the courtroom at the same time.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987).
33. Wildermuth, 310 Md. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
34. Id. at 523, 530 A.2d at 288.
35. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 523, 530 A.2d at 288-89.
37. Id. at 502, 530 A.2d at 278.
38. Id. at 520-23, 530 A.2d at 287-88.
39. Id. at 522-23, 530 A.2d at 288.
40. Id. at 523-24, 530 A.2d at 289.
41. Id. at 510, 530 A.2d at 282.
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cal two-way confrontation between the accuser and accused
does not take place when the child is placed in another room,
the right of confrontation can only be satisfied if the child is"unavailable" to testify and if the substitute (televised testi-
mony) is reliable.42
The Wildermuth court derived this unavailability require-
ment from Ohio v. Roberts. The Wildermuth court found suf-
ficient indicia of reliability present when a child victim is
allowed to testify via closed circuit television: the child testifies
under oath, is subjected to cross-examination by the defendant,
and is in full view of the judge, jury, and the accused while tes-
tifying.43 The only reliability function not provided is that the
accuser is not required to view the accused." However, a find-
ing of "unavailability" would be sufficient to overcome that
deficiency.45
Compliance with section 9-102(a)(1)(ii)46 "is tantamount to
a finding of unavailability in the Roberts sense, and meets the
necessity prong of the Roberts test. ' 47 Section 9-102 allows the
testimony of the child victim to be taken outside the court-
room and shown in the courtroom via closed circuit television
if "[t]he judge determines that testimony by the child victim in
the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emo-
tional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communi-
cate.' 4' Therefore, the "unavailability" prerequisite is a two-
step process: not only must the evidence indicate that the child
will suffer serious emotional harm if required to testify in the
presence of the defendant, the degree of harm must be so sub-
stantial that the child will be unable to communicate.
The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the prosecu-
tion failed to satisfy this difficult prerequisite. The evidence
admitted was insufficient to show that the particular child in
Wildermuth would be so traumatized by testifying in front of
the defendant as to satisfy the requirement of "unavailabil-
ity."' 49 Specifically, the trial judge did not personally question
42. Id. at 515, 530 A.2d at 284.
43. Id. at 515, 530 A.2d at 285.
44. Id. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285.
45. Id. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
46. See supra note 32.
47. 310 Md. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286.
48. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 9-102(A)(1)(II).
49. 310 Md. at 525, 530 A.2d at 289.
[Vol. 12:109
Televised Testimony
or observe the child.50 Moreover, the testimony of the expert
witnesses was too general and speculative regarding the child's
behavior if the child were required to testify in the customary
manner.5" "Testimony about the likely impact on the child tes-
tifying must be definite, related to the statutory standard, and
specific to the potential child witness him or herself." 2
C. The Better View: Televised Testimony as the Functional
Equivalent of In-court Testimony
The Wildermuth case exemplifies the problems that have
developed when courts and legislatures analogize televised tes-
timony to hearsay. Putting an end to this analogy will better
serve the interests of the state and discontinue the overprotec-
tion of the defendant's right to confrontation.
The Wildermuth case can be criticized on three grounds.
First, if the Maryland legislature's enactment of the statutory
standard is "tantamount to a finding of unavailability," the
statute is superfluous; it provides no more protection for vic-
tims of child sexual abuse than was already available under
traditional hearsay analysis.5 3
Second, equating televised testimony with hearsay is inap-
propriate. Substantially all of the functions served by confron-
tation, and the protections not present with hearsay evidence,
are fulfilled by the use of televised testimony: the opportunity
for cross-examination, the observation of the declarant's
demeanor by the trier of fact, and the giving of the statement
under oath.
To illustrate, in those cases in which the Supreme Court
has treated out-of-court statements as hearsay, it has done so
because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine at
an earlier hearing,5 or because the defendant had no way of
knowing the victim did not intend to testify at trial, and thus
may have failed to conduct vigorous cross-examination.55 Tele-
vised testimony, however, is live, is not recorded for presenta-
tion at a later time, and provides full opportunity for cross-
50. Id. at 523, 530 A.2d at 289.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 524, 530 A.2d at 289 (emphasis added).
53. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (admitting hearsay statements when witness is
unavailable).
54. See, eg., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
55. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
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examination by the defendant.'
Furthermore, the opportunity for the trier of fact to
observe the witness's demeanor is preserved with the use of
televised testimony." Modern televising techniques are capa-
ble of presenting clear and undistorted images, and in some
instances, are an improvement over the view that the jury has
of the witness.5" For example, with the use of a zoom lens and
large television screens, the witness's facial details can be
observed with great clarity. 9
Last, the child testifies while under oath, preserving the
seriousness and solemnity of the occasion.
Contemporaneous televised testimony adheres closely to
the giving of testimony in the traditional courtroom setting,
except that the child is not in the physical presence of the
defendant.' For these reasons, televised testimony is the func-
tional equivalent of testimony from within the courtroom.6 '
The final criticism of Wildermuth concerns that court's
56. The absence of actual face-to-face confrontation is not critical for purposes of
cross-examination. Most statutes authorizing the use of televised testimony provide
for the attorneys to be present in the room from which the testimony of the child is
being taken, and ensure that the defendant is able to maintain constant contact with
his attorney through telephone lines. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
57. See People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, -, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (1986) ("It is
apparent to this court from a demonstration of the equipment used in this case that
closed circuit television has the capacity to present clear and accurate sounds and
images to the defendant, the witness, the judge, the jury and the public ...
[I]nstantaneous closed circuit television can surely satisfy the dictates of the
Confrontation Clause."); State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. 411, -, 484 A.2d 1330, 1341 (1984);
("Videotape is sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to properly
perform its function.") (quoting People v. Moran, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420, 39 Cal.App.
3d 398, 410 (1974)); Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1975) (holding that
televised testimony did not significantly affect the ability to question and observe the
witness, and jury impact was found to be little different, whether the witness
appeared in court in person or by television).
58. See State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250, 1258 (Me. 1987); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716
S.W.2d 224, 228 (1986); but see Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 549-50, 524
N.E.2d 366, 375-76 (1988) (the court held that it was error to allow the child victim's
testimony to be televised to the jury because of the poor color, sound, and overall
quality of the transmission); State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 377, 389 N.W.2d 575, 582
(1986) (the camera frequently failed to provide the jury with a full view of the child
and the examiner).
59. See Sheppard, 197 N.J. at -, 484 A.2d at 1334.
60. But see infra note 101.
61. See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 696-97, 529 A.2d 1245, 1252 (1987)
("We agree with the state that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the minor
victim's testimony make it inherently more reliable than the out-of-court declarations
characterized as hearsay. Rather than view the videotaped testimony as hearsay, we
therefore consider it to be the functional equivalent of testimony in court.");
Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 228 (Ky. 1986) ("MTlelevised testimony under
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unfounded construction of section 9-102(a)(1)(ii) as the statu-
tory adoption of the Roberts unavailability test. Although the
inference can reasonably be drawn, nowhere in the statutory
language is a finding of unavailability expressly required.62
The court, therefore, was not compelled to analyze the admis-
sibility of televised testimony under the Roberts unavailability
test. As will be shown, application of the Roberts unavailabil-
ity test to determine whether a child may testify via closed cir-
cuit television is wholly inappropriate.
In Roberts, the evidence sought to be admitted was the
prior testimony of a declarant, taken at a preliminary hearing,
who then disappeared prior to trial. The Roberts Court
examined the unavailability requirement only as it pertained
to the admission of prior testimony.63
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Inadi,' later
emphasized that Roberts is not to be interpreted as standing for
the proposition that a finding of unavailability is first required
whenever the defendant's right to confrontation has been
abridged.' In Inadi, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that a finding of unavailability is first necessary before the
statement of a co-conspirator will be admitted.' In so doing,
the Court stated:
Roberts must be read consistently with the question it
answered, the authority it cited, and its own facts. All of
these indicate that Roberts simply reaffirmed a long-standing
rule . . . that applies unavailability analysis to prior testi-
mony. Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical
[the Kentucky] statute is not hearsay. It is the functional equivalent of testimony in
court.").
62. Some statutes do expressly require a finding of unavailability before televised
testimony is constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2)
(West Supp. 1987) (upon a finding that the "impact on the minor... is shown by clear
and convincing evidence to be so substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a
witness unless closed circuit television is used"); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(1) (Supp. 1988)
("upon a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that the child will suffer at least
moderate emotional or mental harm if required to testify in open court or that such
victim or witness is unavailable"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(c) (1988) (upon a
determination "that the presence of the defendant during testimony . . . would
psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to
testify").
63. 448 U.S. at 68-77, relying on, among other cases, Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968);
and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
64. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986).
65. Id. at 1125-26.
66. Id. at 1126-29.
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proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced
by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable.67
Requiring a finding of unavailability in Roberts served to
determine whether the prior testimony of a witness would be
introduced at trial. Compliance with the rule would thus bene-
fit the "truth-seeking" objective of a trial. However, no compa-
rable benefit was derived from the application of the
unavailability rule in Wildermuth. The rule served only to
determine the location from which the live testimony would be
given.
IV. THE VALUE OF FACE-TO-FACE CONFRONTATION
Although the protections afforded by the Confrontation
Clause and the requirements for the admissibility of hearsay
substantially overlap, they are not identical. s The treatment
of televised testimony as the functional equivalent of testi-
mony inside the courtroom, and not as hearsay, still creates
concerns arising under the sixth amendment due to the
absence of face-to-face confrontation. Therefore, a decision to
invoke the use of televised testimony cannot be made on the
presumption that all child victims will be traumatized as a
result of testifying in the presence of the accused.69 Genera-
lized conclusions concerning the child's psychological welfare
will fail to override a right of constitutional stature.70 Conse-
quently, some degree of judicial scrutiny is required before the
use of televised testimony is constitutionally permissible in any
particular situation.
A review of various cases at the state level illustrates
inconsistent analyses (and thus inconsistent admissibility stan-
dards) of whether the use of televised testimony violates one's
right to confrontation.7 As previously discussed, the proce-
67. Id. at 1126 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
68. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
69. One state statute appears to allow a court to make generalized assumptions.
Rhode Island's statute authorizing televised testimony states that "[w]hen the child is
thirteen (13) years of age or younger at the time of trial, there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that said child is unable to testify before the court without suffering
unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional harm." R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-
13.2 (Supp. 1987).
70. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982).
71. Compare Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 510, 530 A.2d 275, 282 (1987) with
Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 230 (1986) ("There is no constitutional right
to eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The choice of the words "face to face" may have
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dure of televising a child witness's testimony for simultaneous
broadcast into the courtroom denies only the defendant's right
to be in the presence of the witness as she testifies; all other
functions of confrontation are satisfied. Authorities have sim-
ply disagreed as to whether the absence of this one guarantee
justifies the imposition of a more stringent admissibility stan-
dard before the child would be permitted to testify electroni-
cally.72 However, a very recent United States Supreme Court
decision, Coy v. Iowa,73 has for the first time directly addressed
the value of actual face-to-face confrontation, and has provided
the admissibility standard for a procedure that denies only that
element of confrontation.
A. The Facts and Holding of Coy v. Iowa
Appellant Coy was accused of engaging in lascivious acts
with two thirteen-year-old girls. 4 At trial, the court moved to
invoke a procedure authorized by an Iowa statute75 that allows
a witness to either testify from behind a screen or via closed
circuit television. The judge granted the motion and allowed a
screen to be placed in front of the girls as they testified. The
employment of a certain lighting procedure enabled the
defendant to dimly view the witnesses through the screen, but
prevented the witnesses from seeing the defendant, although
they were aware of the defendant's presence.76 Throughout
the procedure, the judge and jury had a full, unobstructed view
of the witnesses.77
Coy appealed his conviction, arguing that his sixth amend-
resulted from an inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-
examination and confrontation without physical presence.") and People v. Algarin, 129
Misc. 2d 1016, 1021, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (the "face-to-face"
requirement "supports the right of cross-examination rather than of physical
confrontation per se").
72. Id.
73. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
74. Id. at 2798.
75. Former IOWA CODE § 910A.3(1), which provided, in relevant part, that "[t]he
court may require a party be confined to an adjacent room or behind a screen or
mirror that permits the party to see and hear the child during the child's testimony,
but does not allow the child to see or hear the party." The use of the procedure was
limited to children under the age of fourteen.
Section 910A.3 has now been incorporated into § 910A.14 of the 1987 Code.
Section 910A.14 expanded the use of testimony from an adjacent room or from behind
screening devices and now also allows for testimony via closed circuit television.
76. State v. Coy, 397 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Iowa 1987).
77. Id. at 734.
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ment right to confrontation was violated when he was denied
face-to-face confrontation with the witnesses. The Iowa
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, however, holding that
the appellant's right to confrontation was not violated because
the three underlying purposes of the Confrontation Clause
were fulfilled: (1) the ability to cross-examine was not
impaired by the use of the screen; (2) the judge and jury were
fully able to view the demeanor of the girls as they testified;
and (3) both girls testified under oath, impressing them with
the seriousness and solemnity of the proceeding."8 Further-
more, the court rejected Coy's argument that a showing of
necessity was first required before permitting the use of the
screen, stating that "[iun the Confrontation Clause context, the
issue of necessity arises when a witness is unavailable for trial
and a party seeks to introduce some prior statement or testi-
mony of that witness. 79
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the Iowa Supreme Court in a 6-2 decision. 0 In reference to
the placement of the screen authorized by the Iowa statute, the
Court found it "difficult to imagine a more obvious or damag-
ing violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face
encounter.""'
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, replete with references
to Shakespeare, President Eisenhower, and past decisions,
upheld the accused's right to encounter his accusers face-to-
face as a core guarantee of the Confrontation Clause. "[T]he
right to face-to-face confrontation serves much the same pur-
pose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause
that we have had more frequent occasion to discuss - the
right to cross-examine the accuser; both 'ensur[e] the integrity
of the fact-finding process.' "82
The majority opinion emphasized the importance of face-
to-face confrontation, "the irreducible literal meaning of the
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S.
719, 722 (1968)).
80. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, White, Stevens, and O'Connor. O'Connor wrote a separate concurring
opinion, in which Justice White joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Kennedy played no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
81. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
82. Id. (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987)).
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clause,""3 as it "serves ends related both to appearances and
reality. '8 4 Confrontation serves to promote the truth-finding
function, since a witness is less likely to lie about the defend-
ant in his presence. 85 The role of the jury in assessing the cred-
ibility of the witness who testifies in the physical presence of
the accused is enhanced. The Court further acknowledged that
the effect of face-to-face confrontation is so profound so as to
unfortunately cause a child witness to be traumatized. How-
ever, the Court stated "[i]t is a truism that constitutional pro-
tections have costs. '8 6
Justice Scalia's rigid stance then softened somewhat when
he noted that the rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause
are not absolute, 7 but may give way when necessary to further
other important interests.8
Permitting a child witness to testify from behind a screen,
in this particular case, did not constitute an exception to Coy's
right to physical confrontation.8 9 The Court required more
than the generalized presumption of the Iowa statute that the
child would be traumatized if required to testify in the custom-
ary manner.90 The requisite finding of necessity would be ful-
filled only by evidence specific to the individual that the State
wished to protect.91
Justice O'Connor joined in the majority opinion, but wrote
a separate opinion in which she recognized the pervasive prob-
lem of child abuse in today's society.
I would permit use of a particular trial procedure that
called for something other than face-to-face confrontation if
that procedure was necessary to further an important public
policy. The protection of child witnesses is, in my view and
in the view of a substantial majority of the States, just such a
policy. The primary focus therefore likely will be on the
83. Id. at 2803.
84. Id. at 2801.
85. Id. at 2802.
86. Id.
87. That the right to confrontation is not absolute was recognized by the Supreme
Court as long ago as 1895 in Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ("general
rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the
accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case") (quoted in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
88. Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2802.
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necessity prong. I agree with the Court that more than the
type of generalized legislative finding of necessity present
here is required. But if a court makes a case-specific finding
of necessity, as is required by a number of state statutes....
our cases suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation
Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of pro-
tecting child witnesses.92
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion stopped short of pro-
viding useful guidance for courts or legislatures in determining
the degree of "necessity" that must be shown before the proce-
dure (whether placement of a screen or televised testimony)
will be upheld as constitutionally permissible. However, by its
long-awaited decision, the Supreme Court has determined that
the appropriate inquiry is whether the state's interest in pro-
tecting its child victims is so compelling as to override the
defendant's right to confrontation, not whether the child wit-
ness is "unavailable."
. The "Necessity" Test
Testifying via television from just outside the courtroom is
not unlike testifying from behind a screen inside the court-
room, the procedure reviewed in Coy v. Iowa. The only ele-
ment served by adherence to the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause, but lacking in the aforementioned pro-
cedures, is the guarantee that the witness will testify in the
presence of the defendant. Application of the "necessity" test
is the better standard for the admissibility of televised testi-
mony because it will now provide greater protection for child
abuse victims that otherwise would not have been afforded the
benefits of the procedure.
The primary interest of a state is to protect its child vic-
tims from being traumatized as a result of testifying in the
presence of the defendant. Whether the use of televised testi-
mony provides the only means of obtaining the child's testi-
mony so that a case may be brought to trial should only be of
secondary concern.
If required to testify in the presence of the defendant, one
of two results may occur. First, the child may suffer severe
emotional distress such that she will not be able to effectively
communicate, or second, the child may suffer psychological
92. Id. at 2805 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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trauma, but not to the degree that prevents her from testify-
ig. Compliance with the "unavailability" prerequisite may
permit the child witness, in the first example, to testify elec-
tronically, but not in the second, since the child would still be
able to testify even though doing so would be psychologically
damaging. Application of this harsher standard wrongly
presumes that a child's ability to communicate is an indication
that the child is suffering no harm. A more difficult predi-
cate,9" such as a finding of "unavailability," thus undermines
the very goals of these statutes; it forces the child to endure
further trauma before the court can determine that the statute
may be invoked to protect the child from further trauma.
Thus, before the procedure for the taking of televised tes-
timony is permitted, it should automatically be presumed that
the child witness will be able to communicate effectively in the
presence of the defendant. However, in the event the prosecu-
tion feels that testimony in the customary manner will cause
the child to suffer needlessly, and in an effort to avoid vic-
timizing the child again, the state should be allowed to intro-
duce supporting evidence. This evidence should be specific to
the child and show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the child would suffer psychological or emotional harm as a
result of testifying in the presence of the defendant. The fac-
tors determinative of the compelling need for the procedure
should pertain only to the inquiry of whether the child is
likely to suffer serious emotional distress, and not to whether
93. A finding of "unavailability" is not the only difficult admissibility standard
adopted by a state court before the practice of televising testimony will be
constitutionally permissible. In State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987),
the court held that the procedure would be permitted only when the State proved by
clear and convincing evidence a compelling need to exclude the defendant from the
taking of the child's testimony: "[wie reiterate that, in light of the constitutional right
of confrontation at stake here, the primary focus of the trial court's inquiry must be on
the reliability of the minor victim's testimony, not on the injury that the victim may
suffer by testifying in the presence of the accused." 204 Conn. at 705, 529 A.2d at 1255-
56 (footnote omitted). In his dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Shea noted:
Without some actual experience where the child has been unable to testify
adequately in a courtroom setting, however, it is not readily apparent that a
'clear and convincing' demonstration complying with the majority's novel
standard can be made, assuming the usual conflict between the opinions of
experts produced by the state and those of the defendant. As a practical
matter, I fear that many child victims will be obliged to testify without the
benefit of the safeguards designed [by the Connecticut statute] to mollify the
impact of the experience of reliving the crime itself that their testimony
entails and thus to protect their mental health.
Id. at 711, 529 A.2d at 1258.
1988]
126 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 12:109
the child will be able to communicate in the presence of the
defendant.94 Rather than requiring a finding of "unavailabil-
ity"95 to satisfy the necessity requirement, a more appropriate
finding is one of "vulnerability."'
V. AN APPEAL TO THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE
Washington has been a forerunner in enacting legislation
designed to protect child witnesses from the psychological
trauma of the courtroom ordeal, to encourage victims to come
forward, and to aid in the prosecution of otherwise difficult
matters. For example, in 1982, Washington was the first of
several states97 to enact what is now commonly known as "the
child hearsay exception."9 The child hearsay exception per-
mits the admission of an out-of-court statement about sexual
94. In reference to the admissibility standard set forth in Section 9-102(a)(1)(ii) of
the Maryland Code, this could be accomplished by striking "such that the child cannot
reasonably communicate." See supra note 32.
95. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987) (upon a finding that
the "impact on the minor ... is shown by clear and convincing evidence to be so
substantial as to make the minor unavailable as a witness unless closed circuit
television is used"); FLA. STAT. § 92.54(1) (Supp. 1988) ("upon a finding that there is a
substantial likelihood that the child will suffer at least moderate emotional or mental
harm if required to testify in open court or that such victim or witness is unavailable");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(c) (1988) (upon a determination "that the presence of the
defendant during testimony... would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to
render the witness unavailable to testify").
96. The term "vulnerability" is borrowed from New York's statute authorizing the
use of two-way closed circuit television in child sexual abuse or assault cases. See N.Y.
CraM. PRoc. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (Supp. 1988). The statute defines a "vulnerable" child
as one likely to suffer severe mental or emotional harm if required to testify at a
criminal proceeding without the use of closed circuit television. Id. at § 65.10(1).
97. See, e.g., COLORADO: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1987); KANSAS: KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1987); MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (1988).
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1987) provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise
admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency
proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings in the courts of the
state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury,
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable
as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative
evidence of the act. A statement may not be admitted under this section
unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement
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abuse, made by a child under the age of ten, provided that the
court finds the statement to contain sufficient indicia of relia-
bility, and, if the child is unavailable, that evidence of the crim-
inal act is corroborated.
However, the child hearsay exception should not be mis-
taken as a substitute for the much needed legislation authoriz-
ing the use of televised testimony of child sexual abuse victims.
The child hearsay exception allows only for the admission of
past, out-of-court statements, about which the child, if unavail-
able, will not be subject to cross-examination, thereby incorpo-
rating the requirements set forth by Ohio v. Roberts. The
admissibility of televised testimony, on the other hand, should
not be analyzed under the Ohio v. Roberts criteria. As previ-
ously discussed,99 the testimony is live, is broadcast simultane-
ously into the courtroom, and is fully subject to cross-
examination by the defendant.
A statute authorizing the use of televised testimony would
provide additional protection for child victims of sexual abuse
in Washington. In an effort to accommodate the competing
concerns of the state and the defendant, the statutory language
should address the procedural guidelines necessary for taking
televised testimony; the burden of proof that must first be
overcome by the state before the procedure will be permitted;
and the factors to be considered by the trial court that indicate
a particular child's vulnerability.
The admissibility standard and suggested factors for con-
sideration might be worded as follows:
The court on its own motion, or on the motion of the
proponent of a child witness, may order the child's testi-
mony to be taken by closed circuit television, provided that
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence at the
time of the order that the child witness is likely to suffer
psychological or emotional trauma as a result of testifying in
the presence of the defendant. If the court orders the use of
a suitable alternative for taking the testimony of the child,
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
For countervailing commentaries on the constitutionality of Washington's
child hearsay exception, see Note, Sexual Abuse of Children - Washington's
New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813 (1983), and Note, Confronting
Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the Sexual Abuse
Hearsay Exception, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984).
99. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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the court shall make and enter specific findings upon the
record describing with particularity the reasons for such
order. In making the determination set out above, the trial
court may consider: (1) the age of the child; (2) the
demeanor of the child as observed during all phases of the
criminal proceeding; (3) the relationship of the child to the
defendant; (4) whether the defendant is in a position of
authority to the child; (5) whether a firearm or deadly
weapon was used by the defendant in the commission of the
crime; (6) whether the defendant inflicted any serious bodily
injury upon the victim during the commission of the crime;
(7) whether the child or another family member was sub-
jected to threats of bodily harm by the defendant in order to
prevent the child from reporting the offense or testifying
during any phase of the criminal proceeding; (8) the conduct
of the defendant during the hearing or trial that may cause
the child to be traumatized if required to be in the presence
of the defendant; (9) expert testimony as to whether the
child is susceptible to psychological harm if required to tes-
tify in the presence of the defendant; and (10) any other fac-
tors the trial court finds relevant to the issue of the child's
susceptibility to psychological harm.1° °
Striking a proper balance between the state's interest in
protecting the welfare of child victims and the defendant's con-
frontation right can be further accomplished by providing for
the use of two-way closed circuit television.1°0 While the
100. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In Globe, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute that authorized mandatory
exclusion of the press and the public from trials of specified sexual offenses involving
a minor victim. The Court went on to recognize, however, that the state had a
compelling interest in protecting young victims from the psychological trauma of
testifying in open court. To aid courts in determining when the state's interest
overrode the constitutional concern, the Court suggested the following standard:
A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is
necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim. Among the factors to be
weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the
interests of parents and relatives.
457 U.S. at 608 (footnotes omitted).
The statutes authorizing the use of closed circuit television in California (CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1987)) and New York (N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 65.20(9)(a)-(1) (Supp. 1988)) also set out similar factors that the court should
consider in determining whether the procedure is constitutionally permissible.
101. Interestingly enough, Justice O'Connor found that the use of two-way
televised testimony, by which the image of the defendant is transmitted into the room
for viewing by the child as she testifies, might not raise any Confrontation Clause
concerns because the testimony of the witness takes place in the presence of the
defendant. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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child's image is being projected into the courtroom, an image of
the courtroom, including the judge, the jury, and the defend-
ant, can be projected simultaneously into the room where the
child is located.10 2  As a result, actual face-to-face contact,
albeit electronically, will take place, and arguably all compo-
nents of the Confrontation Clause will be satisfied." 3
The Confrontation Clause of Washington's Constitution
does not present an obstacle to the enactment of statutory lan-
guage requiring a lesser burden of proof before televised testi-
mony will be allowed. Unlike the United States Constitution,
the Washington Constitution specifically requires "face to
face" confrontation between the accused and his accuser.'l 4
This express requirement might suggest that the Washington
courts have interpreted its Confrontation Clause more strictly
than its federal counterpart, and in turn justified the determi-
nation that a higher burden of proof is first required before a
procedure that denies the defendant this right is allowed. Yet,
the Washington courts have not done so. In fact, when given
the opportunity, the Washington Supreme Court has addressed
Confrontation Clause issues by relying on federal precedent
rather than by adopting their own analysis specific to the
State's Confrontation Clause. 05 Therefore, Washington's con-
stitutional requirement of face-to-face confrontation has not
been held to provide greater protection for the accused, and
thus does not create a justification for the imposition of a more
burdensome standard of admissibility for televised
testimony1c6
102. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
103. See generally, Note, supra note 3.
104. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to... meet the witness against him face to face ......
105. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1986) (the
Confrontation Clause analysis and application of the Roberts "unavailability" test
applied to determine whether the admission of declaration against penal interest was
proper); State v. Hieb, 107 Wash. 2d 97, 727 P.2d 239 (1986) (same, excited utterance);
State v. Parris, 98 Wash. 2d 140, 654 P.2d 508 (1982) (same, declaration against penal
interest).
106. Indeed, the Confrontation Clauses contained in the state constitutions of both
Kentucky and Pennsylvania contain wording identical to that of Washington's. Yet
the courts in those states have refused to construe the express language as strictly as
might be suggested, finding that the "face to face" requirement did not provide any
greater protection for the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 229
(1986) ('"Tere is no authority to support the proposition that the right of
confrontation guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution should be construed more
stringently than the same right in the United States Constitution."); Commonwealth v.
Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, -, 531 A.2d 459, 462 (1987) (" 'There is no constitutional
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VI. CONCLUSION
Allowing a child victim of sexual abuse to provide testi-
mony via closed circuit television is a minimal infringement of
a defendant's right to confront his accuser. The testimony is
given under oath, provides full opportunity for cross-examina-
tion by the defense, and allows the trier of fact to view the
demeanor of the child while subject to questioning. The only
difference between this procedure and testimony given under
normal conditions is that the child is not forced to look at the
defendant or listen to his comments. Accordingly, the need to
protect the child victim from further psychological injury
weighs more heavily than does the defendant's right to literal
physical confrontation.
Televised testimony should not be treated as hearsay,
thereby requiring that the child be found unavailable before
she is permitted to testify via closed circuit television. The test
for unavailability is harsh and counterproductive to the policy
underlying the procedure, that is, protecting the child from
serious psychological injury. Rather, the procedure functions
as the constitutional equivalent of in-court testimony.
The Washington Legislature should respond to the needs
of children in the courtroom by enacting a statute authorizing
the use of televised testimony under the guidelines described
above. The statute should incorporate the "necessity" test
promulgated by the Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa,
and provide the trial court with guidelines, such as those sug-
gested in this Comment, to ensure that both the interests of
the child and the defendant are protected.
Kimberley Seals Bressler
right to eyeball to eyeball confrontation. The choice of the words 'face to face' may
have resulted from an inability to foresee technological developments permitting cross-
examination and confrontation without physical presence.' ") (quoting Commonwealth
v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d at 230).
The Washington, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania courts' refusals to construe the
express "face to face" language of their states' Confrontation Clauses as providing
greater protection for a defendant may have been due in part to the Supreme Court's
emphasis that the Confrontation Clause of the federal constitution, although not
expressly stating so, "reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial." Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added). Now, in light of Coy v. Iowa, an adoption
of a separate analysis under the stricter language would be incorrect. See supra notes
82-86 and accompanying text.
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